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T H E INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 






STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an original proceedings before the Supreme 
Court of Utah for the purpose of having the lawfulness of 
an award dated December 14, 1965 of the Indusitria1l Com-
mission of Utah in a proceedings entitled Robert E. Markus, 
Applicant, vs. Kennecott Copper Corporation, defendant, 
Claim No. 6315, inquired into and determined as provided 
by Section 35-1-83, U. C. A., 1953, as amended by Laws of 
Utah, 1965. 
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DISPOSITION BY INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH 
On December 14, 1965, the Industrial Commission of 
Utah made its order and award that Kennecott Copper 
Corporation pay Robert E. Markus temporary total com-
pensation from June 11, 1964 until Applicant was released 
by his physician, that it pay all medical and hospital bills 
incurred because of the injury to said Applicant, that it 
pay him permanent partial disability for 10% loss of bodily 
function of 20 weeks at $51.40 per week for a total of 
$1,028.00, and that it pay Matt Biljanic the sum of $150.00 
for his services in connection with the proceedings before 
the Commission, the same to be deducted from the award. 
Kennecott Copper Corporation filed with the Industrial 
Commission of Utah a Motion for Review on December 29, 
1965 as required by Section 35-1-82.55, U. C. A., 1953, as 
enacted by Laws of Utah, 1965 as a prerequisite for the 
filing of this action in the Supreme Court of Utah. This ' 
Motion for Review was denied by order of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah dated January 13, 1966. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Kennecott Copper Corporation, upon this review, seeks 
to have the award of the Industrial Commission dated De-
cember 14, 1965 set aside by the Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Cl,aim and Denial 
The claim of Applicant was that he sustained injlll'Y 
on May 16, 1964 while employed as a brakeman at the 
Bingham open pit copper mine by Kennecott Copper Cor-
poration. That he was re-railing a train car and was push-
ing a frog up under the wheels and got a sharp pain be-
tween his shoulder blades (R. 4). Kennecott denied liabil-
ity (R. 7). Kennecott, as shown by its Safety Engineer's 
report dated July 10, 1964, claimed that there was no acci-
rlent or incident such as a trip, slip, fall or blow on May 16, 
1964 ?.nd that Applicant had had back trouble before and 
tllat the pain which Applicant felt on that date and subse-
riuent thereto was the result of his previous bodily condi-
tion and ·was not caused by any accident or incident on May 
1c, 1961 (R. 12-14). 
Pl'Oceedings Before the Industrial Commission 
The Employee's Application for Hearing to Settle In-
dustrial Accident Claim was filed with the Industrial Com-
:nission of Utah on August 26, 1964 (R. 4). On December 
7, 1964, a hearing was held before Commissioner Wiesley 
( R. 29-82) . The notice of the hearing had written thereon 
"Medical evidence will be received only after the panel re-
port has been filed" (R. 11). On February 17, 1965, the 
Commission made its order denying the application (R. 
83). A Petition for Rehearing was filed with the Commis-
sion by Markus on March 8, 1965 (R. 84-6). By order 
dated March 12, 1965, the Commission made its order de-
nying the Petition for Rehearing (R. 87). No application 
was made by Markus to the Supreme Court of Utah as 
provided by Section 35-1-83, U. C. A., 1953, for a Writ of 
Certiorari for the purpose of having the lawfulness of the 
order denying the application, dated February 17, 1965, or 
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the lawfulness of the order denying the Petition for Re-
hearing, dated March 12, 1965, inquired into and de-
termined. On April 13, 1965, apparently on its own mo-
tion, the Commission made an order granting the Petition 
for Rehearing and rescinding its order of March 12, 1965 
(R. 88). 
The Industrial Commission of Utah on June 28, 1965, 
made its order setting time and place for further hearing-
for the 12th day of July, 1965 and said hearing was held 
on said date. Following this hearing, the medical issues 
were referred to a Medical Panel by the Industrial Com-
mission and the Medical Panel filed its report with the 
Commission (R. 94-5). Copies thereof were mailed by the 
Commission to the Applicant and employer on October 19, 
1965 (R. 92). No objection was filed to the Medical Panel 
report although Kennecott, through its attorneys, filed 
with the Commission a letter in regards thereto on Novem-
ber 4, 1965 (R. 96). The Commission, on December 14, 
1965, made its order awarding compensation to the Appli· 
cant (R. 115). On December 29, 1965, Kennecott filed its 1 
Motion for Review with the Commission (R. 116-17). This 
was by the Commission denied on January 13, 1966 (R. 
119). 
The Claimed Accident 
On May 16, 1964, at about 10 :00 A.M., Markus was 
underneath the wheels of a train car which had been de· 
railed for the purpose of re-railing it. This was part of 
his regular duties as a brakeman, at which job he was then 
working. At the hearing on December 6, 1964, he testified 
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that he was pushing a frog up under the wheels (R. 32-3) 
and straining and lifting as mueh as possible to get it into 
position (R. 41). He said that at the time he got a sharp 
pain between his shoulder blades (R. 32). A frog is a piece 
of equipment used to re-rail a railroad car. According to 
Markus, it weighs between 50 and 100 pounds (R. 33). Mr. 
Ross Pino, Safety Engineer for Kennecott, testified that 
it weighs between 60 and 75 pounds (R. 76). Pictures of 
a frog were received in evidence (R. 25-6). Markus con-
tinued to work the rest of the shift. He testified that that 
afternoon it really started to bother him, that he laid on 
a heating pad all that night and the next day he went to 
work and went to the Company's clinic in the afternoon 
(R. 33) . Markus complained to his engineer on the day of 
the re-railing that he had hurt his back re-railing the train 
(R. 35). The engineer on the train, Mr. Asay, confirmed 
that Markus was bothered with his back that afternoon and 
more marked the next day. That a day or two before that, 
he had worked with Markus and hadn't noticed any prob-
lem. Markus worked with Asay only occasionaily and they 
were never listed permanently as a crew (R. 51). George 
J. Strand, the operator of the shovel which was loading the 
cars of the train on which Markus was the brakeman, testi-
fied that he thought that Markus had indicated that he 
suffered some injury because after re-railing the train 
and when the cars of the train had been loaded and the 
train had gone to the dump and returned to the shovel, 
Markus "couldn't hardly get up the ladder" of the engine 
(R. 56). He further testified that Markus said he hurt 
his back underneath the car and that Markus was going 
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around like an old man that was hurt (R. 57). Markui 
did not report any accident to his foreman, John Robert. 
son, on the day of the claimed accident (R. 59). 
Conduct of Markus After Alleged Accident 
Markus continued to work for Kennecott on his regu. 
hr job from the date of the alleged accident, May 16, 1964. 
uninterruptedly on his scheduled days until May 29, 196J 
(R. 46-7, 66). Since going to California on or about June 
1, 1964, he has continued to reside there. He went to thf 
office of Lester 0. Hamlin, Industrial Relations Repmeil· 
tative of Kennecott on May 28 or 29, 1964 for the purpose ' 
of terminating his employment. l\fa~·kt.1 s dirl not compl?lr 
of any injur.v that he was suffering from at that time (R 
66). He planned on taking his vacation and terminatin.c 
his employment on or about June 8, 1964. On June I, 1964. 
Warren Cole, an official of the Union in which :Markus \I'm 
a member, notified Hamlin not to remove Markus from the 
payroll because he had been hospitalized in California. 
Markus was then kept on the payroll (R. 22, 66). He \rnf 
still living in California at the time of the original hearing 
before Commissioner Wiesley on December 7, 1964 rR 
35-6). He ·was still there on July 12, 1965 at the time of 
the further hearing before Commissioner Wiesley on July 
12, 1965 (R. 111). He returned to Salt Lake City to re· 
ceive medical treatment upon recommendation by Cali· 
fornia doctors and first consulted Dr. Wayne Hebertson 
(R. 36-7) and received various treatments recommended 
by him and finally was operated on by Dr. Boyd G. Hol· 
brook on June 25, 1964 who performed an anterior exCision 
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of the C-6, 7 intervertebral disc and an interbody fusion 
(R. 2). He was not referred to either Dr. Hebertson or Dr. 
Holbrook by his employer or its doctors, but he received 
the services of these doctors at his own request. He did 
not consult Kennecott or its doctors after leaving Utah on 
or abm1t June 1, 1964 (R. 48). 
Markus made application with Travelers Insurance 
1'ompany for benefits as a result of the condition of his 
neck as a non-industrial accident (R. 72). He explained 
that l\Ir. Christensen who has charge of medical records 
for Kennecott (R. 78) told him to go ahead and file with 
Tra\'elers and he would have money coming in before wait-
ing for the Industrial Commission decision (R. 81). 
Mr. Markus did not file his Application for Hearing 
to Settle Industrial Claim with the Industrial Commission 
of Utah until August 26 ,1964 which was approximately 
two months after he had had the operation by Dr. Holbrook. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah had not been requested 
to grant permission, for the operation or to authorize it. 
Back and Neck Trouble Suffered by Markus 
Mr. Markus advised Dr. Holbrook on June 21, 1964 
that he has a curvature of the low back due to a birth de-
fect but that he had not had much trouble with it (R. 1). 
X-Rays of the cervical spine as reported by Dr. Holbrook 
showed a congenital fusion of C-1 and C-3 (R. 2). While 
in California in June, 1964, his back bothered him and he 
consulted doctors there and returned to Salt Lake City and 
was operated on on June 25, 1964 (R. 2). Before the oper-
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ation, a myelogram was performed by Dr. Hebertson which 
showed a large defect on the right between C-6 and 7 (R. 
103). The operation by Dr. Holbrook confirmed a ruptured ' 
or protruded disc which was excised (R. 2). He had had 
back trouble for several years. As early as May 31, 1957. 
he had "aching shoulders for five days" (R. 9, 27, 38). He 
had an injury to the back on April 13, 1963 (R. 27). The 
incident of May 16, 1964 was reported as an industrial in. ' 
jury by Markus when he went to the Company clinic on 
May 17, 1964. The dector there diagnosed it as a sprain 
(R. 15, 28). Markus also went to Dr. B. 0. Egbert, a chiro-
practor, during the moths of March, April and May of 1961 , 
(R. 9, 38). He also went to Dr. R. S. Clegg, an orthopedic 
surgeon in Salt Lake City in December, 1961 because his 
lower back was bothering him (R. 9, 39). Markus slipped 
and fell on the ice as he was walking out of his garage in 
January, 1963 and had a stiff neck for three or four days 
and was off work for four days being treated by Dr. J. A 
Parker (R. 9, 39). 
Medical Evidence of the Claimed Injury to Markus 
Kennecott's doctor diagnosed it as a sprain (R. 15, 28). 
Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, who was engaged by Markus as a 
private surgeon, performed an operation with the anterior 
excision C-6, 7 intervertebral disc and an interbody fusion 
on June 25, 1964. This was before Markus filed his claim 
with the Industrial Commission. Dr. Holbrook's report of 
this operation dated June 30, 1964, however, was made to 
Kennecott and a copy sent to the Industrial Commission 
and received by it on July 1, 1964 (R. 1). A copy thereof 
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was also introduced in evidence as part of Exhibit 1 (R. 
19-20) at the hearing before the Commission on December 
7, 1964 (R. 61). Dr. Holbrook testified at the further hear-
ing before the Commission on July 12, 1964 (R. 100-12). 
His testimony included a repeat of the information given 
in his letter of June 30, 1964. In answer to a hypothetical 
question as to whether he had an opinion as to the likeli-
hood of Markus suffering an injury, he answered that he 
could g-ive an opinion (R. 106). He then gave a dissertation 
and explained that it is very rare for a completely normal 
rlisc to ever be ruptured by any type of trauma; that ordin-
<trily when a disc ruptures or protrudes, it is a disc that 
has previous degenerative changes and degenerative changes 
are almost universal (R. 106). He did in response to a 
very leading question answer that it would be likely for a 
man to sustain the type of injury where he was doing some 
heavy lifting * * * and where he was unable to func-
tion properly thereafter (R. 107). (Emphasis added.) 
Markus did not tell Dr. Holbrook of his fall on the ice on 
January 12, 1963 or that he had received treatments from 
Dr. B. 0. Egbert or that he had consulted with Dr. Clegg 
on January 4, 1962. 
Markus was examined on August 27, 1965 by a Medical 
Panel appointed by the Commission consisting of Norman 
R. Beck, M.D., Chairman, Sherman S. Coleman, M.D. and 
Samuel Taylor, M.D. They made their report under date of 
September 10, 1965 (R. 94-5). The Panel made findings 
including the following: 
"(1) The type of maneuver as described by 
the patient could be conceived .to cause the hernia-
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tion of the cervical intervertebral disc giving ris, 
to nerve root pain" (R. 95). 
There is nothing in the report which indicates that 
Markus told the Panel about his former back and neck 
troubles, including his fall on the ice on January 12, 1963. , 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
HAD NO JURISDICTION TO ISSUE ITS OR-
DER OF APRIL 13, 1965 GRANTING THE PE-
TITION FOR REHEARING. 
This problem was considered by the Supreme Court 
of Utah in the case of Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commis-
sion, decided May 25, 1923, 61 Utah 514, 215 P. 1047. 
In this case, the applicant, an employee of Salt Lake 
City, claimed to have been injured in the course of his em-
ployment and filed an application for compensation. A 
hearing was had before the Industrial Commission and on 
June 17, 1922, compensation was awarded. Salt Lake City 
immediately applied for a rehearing, which, on August 1st. ' 
was granted, and on the same day the hearing was had, the 
award set aside and compensation denied. On September 
6th, the applicant filed a new application before the Com· 
mission setting forth the circumstances of the injury the , 
same as if the case had not been previously determined. 
After hearing the evidence, the Commission on December 
2nd entered an order setting aside its decision of August 
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1st and reinstated its former order awarding compensation. 
Salt Lake City applied for a rehearing and when it was 
denied by seasonable application to the Supreme Court 
sought to have the case revie\ved and the award set aside. 
The Supreme Court annulled, vacated and set aside the 
;1ward of the Commission entered on December 2nd. 
The court held that in the last hearing the Commission 
proceeded v,rithout jurisdiction. 
The court interpreted Section 314.8, Compiled Laws of 
utah, 1917, as amended in Session Laws, 1919, page 164 
which reads as follows : 
"Within thirty days after the application for 
a rehearing is denied, or, if the application is 
granted, within thirty days after the rendition of 
the decision on the rehearing, any party affected 
thereby (including the state insurance fund), may 
apply to the Supreme Court of this state for a writ 
of certiorari or review (hereinafter ref erred to as 
a writ of review) for the purpose of having the 
lawfulness of the original award or the award on 
rehearing inquired into and determined" (215 P. 
1047-8, 61 Utah 517). 
The provisions of the above quoted section are the 
same as Section 35-1-83, U. S. C., 1953, except for the sub-
stitution in the latter of the "Commission of Finance" for 
"the state insurance fund". This section was later amended 
by the 1965 Legislature, the amendment taking effect on 
July 1, 1965. This 1965 amendment did not, however, alter 
the substance of the section. 
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The court also interpreted and had in mind Section 
3144 of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, which reads as 
follows: 
"The powers and jurisdiction of the Commis. 
sion over each case shall be continuing, and it may 
from time to time make such modfication or chang.e · 
with respect to former findings or orders with re-
spect thereto as in its opinion may be justified" 
(215 P. 1048, 61 Utah 518). 
The provisions of the above quoted section are the same 
as Section 35-1-78, U. C. A., 1953, as amended in 1961 and 
1963, except for the addition in 1961 of a provision for the 
destruction by the Commission of records in certain cases ' 
and in 1963 by the insertion of a reference to a claim filed 
as in 35-1-99. 
The following language by Judge Thurman appears 
applicable to the present case : 
"In this case the Commission on the first hear· 1 
ing, in June, 1922, awarded the applicant compen· 
sation. The city, in accordance with the provisions 
of the section above quoted, applied for a rehearing. 
The rehearing was granted, the award set aside, 
and compensation denied. Under the plain, une-
quivocal provisions of the statute the remedy of the · 
applicant was to apply to this court within 30 days 
for a writ of review. Instead of pursuing that 
course, applicant delayed for more than 30 days 
and filed a new application for a hearing before the 
Commission the same as if the case had never be-
fore been heard. Such a procedure flies in the verJ 
face of the statute. If such procedure is upheld, liti· 
gation before the Commission in any given case IIlllY 
never end. It was just as obligatory upon the ap-
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plicant, when the Commission granted the city's ap-
plication for a rehearing, August 1, 1922, to apply 
to this court within 30 days for a writ of review, as 
it would have been for the city to do so if its appli-
cation for rehearing had been denied" (215 P. 1048, 
61 Utah 517). 
The above case was cited with approval in Ferguson 
v. Industrial Commission, decided July 21, 1923, 63 Utah 
112, 221 P. 1099. 
In the Ferguson case, after the denial of compensation, 
a Petition for Rehearing was filed with the Industrial Com-
mission on April 28, 1922 which was denied on May 8, 
1922. On September 10, 1922, a second Petition for Rehear-
ing was filed which the Commission granted. On the sec-
ond hearing, the Commission made an order on October 31, 
1922 that the application be dismissed. Within 30 days 
from the date of the last order, the plaintiff applied to the 
Supreme Court for a writ of Review. In referring to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission, this court said: 
"The first petition for rehearing having been 
denied on May 8, 1922, the jurisdiction of the In-
dustrial Commission ceased. It was then incumbent 
upon the applicant to apply to this court within 30 
days for a writ of review or to abide by the deci-
sion" (221 P. 1099, 63 Utah 114). 
A more recent case of CaUahan v. lndustri!Ll Commis-
sion, decided June 24, 1943, 104 Utah 256, 139 P. 2d 214, 
again considered the problem. After a hearing before the 
Industrial Commission, the Commission on June 11, 1942 
denied compensation. On July 13, 1942, the plaintiff filed 
an application with the Commission for a rehearing out-
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lining several reasons therefor and on July 16, 1942, this 
application for rehearing was denied. On August 13, 1942. 
the plaintiff filed with the Commission a "Supplemental 
Application for Rehearing". The Commission took no ac. 
tion on this "Supplemental Application" and the plaintif1' 
on August 15, 1942 applied to the Supreme Court for a 11Ti: 
of review. The court made the following statement: 
"Plaintiff then filed with what he terms :1 
'Supplemental Application', three affidavits con-
taining the proffered additional evidence. This \\·ai 
simply a second petition for rehearing, for \rhic! 
there is no authority in law. The statute abon 
quoted is jurisdictional, and the Commission was 
warranted in disregarding this untimely 'Supple-
. mental Application'. Ferguson v. Industrial Com-
mission, 63 Utah 112, 221 P. 1099, wherein it is 
said: 
" 'The first petition for rehearing having 
been denied on May 8, 1922, the jurisdiction oi 
the Industrial Commission ceased. It was then 
incumbent upon the applicant to apply to this 
court within 30 days for a writ of review or 
to abide by the decision. Salt Lake City v. In-
dustrial Commission [61 Utah 514], 215 P. 
1047'" (139 P. 2d 216, 104 Utah 260). 
The section of the statute referred to was 42-1-76, U. 
C. A., 1943 which is the same as 35-1-82, U. C. A., 1953. 
None of the above cases have been overruled. 
The Commission, in its order of April 13, 1965 grant· 
ing a rehearing to the Applicant, stated that it was com· 
pelled to do so by the Supreme Court's decision on the Ruth 
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B. Griffith case, No. 10126 (R. 88). This case is Griffith 
<.. Industrial Commission, decided February 18, 1965, 16 
Utah 2d 264, 399 P. 2d 204. Commissioner Wiesley at the 
further hearing held on July 12, 1965 explained : 
"The Commission issued an order ( ed) on 2-17-
6G denying Applicant's claim. A petition for re-
hearing was filed on March 8, 1965. The Supreme 
Court decision in the Ruth B. Griffith, No. 1016, 
compelled the Commission to rescind its previous 
order of 3-12-65, and on 4-13-65 the petition for re-
hearing was granted. 
"The reason for the change is the Supreme 
Coi_11 t finally decided that, if the 30th day falls on 
" holiday, they can have until the next working day 
to file, and for that reason the petition for rehear-
~ng was granted" (R. 99). 
The Commission, in its order of December 14, 1965 
granting co:ri.1pensation to Markus, also included therein the 
above quoted paragraphs. 
The reason given was not applicable in this case. The 
order denying compensation was dated February 17, 1965 
<R. 83). The Petition for Rehearing was filed March 8, 
i965 (R. 8-1). It was filed well within the thirty-day period 
provided by 35-1-82, U. C. A., 1953 within which a Petition 
for Rehearing is permitted to be filed with the Commis-
sion. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Industrial Com-
mission had no jurisdiction to issue its order of April 13, 
1965 granting the Petition for Rehearing and that it was 
not compelled to do so by the decision of the Supreme Court 
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in the Ruth B. Griffith case. The only remedy which the ' 
Applicant, Robert H. Markus, had following the decision 
of the Industrial Commission denying his application for 
rehearing which was dated March 12, 1965 was to apply 
to the Supreme Court for a Writ as provided by 35-1-83 
' 
U. C. A., 1953. Inasmuch as he did not do so within thirty 
days from the order denying his application for rehearing. 
he exhausted his remedy. The order denying compensatior: 
dated March 12, 1965 should be approved and affirmed. 
If this court does not agree with plaintiff's contention 
on Point 1, then it is necessary for it to give consideration 
to plaintiff's Point 2. 
POINT II. 
THERE ARE NO FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OR EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT THE AW ARD OF THE INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION. 
Plaintiff is not unmindful of the many cases decided 
by this court which hold that the Industrial Commission 
is vested with exclusive power and responsibility of decid· 
ing questions of fact. It is the contention of plaintiff that · 
there is no material, substantial, competent, legal evidence 
in the record upon which the Commission could make an 
award in favor of the Applicant and that in doing so, it 
acted arbitrarily. 
The Commission, after the original hearing, made its 
order dated February 17, 1965 denying compensation. In 
the order, it recited the facts of the incident upon which 
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the Applicant based his claim for compensation. It found 
that there was nothing unusual about the incident. As 
plaintiff interprets the order, it negates any unusual exer-
tion, a slip, a fall or a blow suffered by Applicant in the 
course of his day in and day out employment activities (R. 
83). 
The Applicant's surgeon added nothing to the factual 
situation. He could not and did not testify that the pro-
truding; disc which he excised on June 25, 1964 was caused 
by the incident of May 16, 1964. In his report of June 30, 
1964, he advised that Markus had related to him that he 
was in good health until about one month before when he 
was under the wheels of a derailed train and was lifting 
and developed a sudden pain between the shoulder blades 
(R. 1) (Emphasis added). The order of the Commission 
dated February 17, 1965 in effect found that Markus was 
not lifting. The application of Markus stated that he was 
pushing a frog, not lifting it (R. 4, 83). The commission 
in its order of February 17, 1965, stated: "Applicant on 
several occasions told about pushing, not lifting a frog. 
His counsel suggested lifting" (R. 83). 
In the hypothetical question asked of Dr. Holbrook by 
Applicant's attorney at the further hearing on July 12, 
1965, Dr. Holbrook was asked to assume that Markus on 
May 16, 1964 vrns doing some heavy Ufting and was unable 
to function properly thereafter (R. 107) (Emphasis 
added) . These facts were not in evidence and the opinion 
of Dr. Holbrook was therefore improper. His opinion was 
also given without being informed by Markus that he had 
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had previous back and neck trouble. As stated in an opin. 
ion of Judge Elias Hansen in the case of Diaz v. Industrial 
Comniiss!on, decided July 21, 1932, 80 Utah 77, 13 P. 2d 
307: 
"Answers to hypothetical questions not founded 
upon, but contrary to, the established facts in a 
case have no probative value" ( 13 P. 2d 31 i, Sil 
Utah 104). 
The lnclusti-ial ComE1issio11, by its or<ler of December 
14, 1965 awarding compensation, adopted the Medical Panel , 
report dated September 10, 1965. The only finding therein 
connecting the incident of May 16, 1964 with the herniated 
disc for the excision of which Dr. Holbrook opernted nn 
June 25, 1964, is: 
" ( 1) The type of maneuver as described by 
the patient could be conceived to cause the hernia· 
tion of the cervical intervertebral disc giving rise 
to nerve root pain" ( R. 95) (Emphasis added). 
Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edi· 
tion, Unabridged, page 552, gives the following definitions 
of conceive: 
"2. To take into one's mind; as, to conceiYe 
a dislike; to formulate, to devise, form a conception 
of, or imagine. 
"3. To apprehend by reason or imagination; 
to comprehend; to understand. 
"4. To think or suppose; to be of the opinion; 
as, whatever." 
Synonyms given are: "Think, suppose, fancy, sus· 
pect." 
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It appears conceive is something similar to possible, 
but much less than probable. 
It appears that in the minds of the Medical Panel, 
there was very grave doubt that the incident of May 16, 
1964 caused the herniation of the disc. The Commission, 
basing its award to Markus, appears to have done so upon 
surmise, conjecture of the likelihood, or at the most, the 
possibility that the incident of May 16, 1964 caused the 
herniation of the disc. 
Although the case of Sugar v. Industrial Commission, 
decided January 24, 1938, 94 Utah 56, 75 P. 2d 311 involved 
a question of whether or not a gun shot causing death was 
self inflicted and therefore not in the course of employ-
ment, while in this case the question is whether or not a 
particular condition resulted from an incident in the course 
of employment, the language of Justice Ephraim Hanson 
is relevant. Justice Hanson said: 
"Where the Commission is driven to surmise 
or conjecture, the injured person or his dependents 
cannot recover. This is too well settled to require 
citation" (94 Utah 59, 75 P. 2d 312). 
In the case of General Mills v. Industrial Commission, 
decided December 19, 1941, 101 Utah 214, 120 P. 2d 279, 
which was a second decision setting aside an award by the 
Commission, the question considered was which of two acci-
dents caused the death of an employee. He had one accident 
on March 17, 1938 while in the course of his employment 
and another on March 20, 1938, not in the course of his 
employment. The Commission on the original hearing 
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found that death resulted from the first injury. On first 
review by the Supreme Court, award was set aside. On 
second hearing before the Commission where additional 
evidence was received, it again granted compensation. The 
Sup:r:eme Court reversed the amended award. 
Citing earlier cases, Justice Wolfe, speaking for the 
court, said : 
"Mere surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation 
is insufficient. Further, the burden is on the com. 
plainant to prove that the injury is compensable" 
( 120 P. 2d 280, 101 Utah 217). 
The record is sufficient to show that Markus, on May 
16, 1964 after getting out from under the wheels of the 
car, had some pain and that he went to Kennecott's clinic 
and saw a doctor on the following day. The doctor diag· 
nosed it as a sprain (R. 15). Assuming, but not admitting, : 
that there was an injury received by Markus on May 16, 
1964 while working for plaintiff, he suffered no disability 
therefrom. In addHion to the proof of the injury, he had 
the further burden to show by competent evidence that this 
accident caused the condition for which he was operated 
on by Dr. Holbrook and from which he suffered disability. 
No competent evidence is in the record to show this. 
The conduct of Markus after May 16, 1964 is incon· 
sistent with his later contentions after he had had his 
operation on June 25, 1964 that he had received a herniated 
disc as a result of the incident of May 16, 1964. He gave 
notice to his employer tha;t he was terminating his employ· 
ment at the end of his vacation time which he had accumu· 
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lated or on about June 7, 1964. He worked at his regular 
job with plaintiff every day he was scheduled to work after 
the incident to and including May 29, 1964. He did not, 
after May 17, 1964, seek any medical attention from his 
employer or its doctors. He applied to Travelers Insurance 
Company for benefits which might be due him for a non-
industrial disability. It was not until after he had been 
operated on by Dr. Holbrook that he applied for workmen's 
compensation benefits. He had had back and neck troubles 
for yearn which were apparently corrected by Dr. Holbrook 
but which \\'ere not the result of the incident of May 16, 
1964. 
Plaintiff respectively submits that the award of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah dated December 14, 1965 
in favor of Markus is not justified by the record of the 
proceedings and evidence before the Commission, that said 
award is arbitrary and that this court should reverse and 
annul it. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARSONS, BERLE, EVANS 
& LATIMER, 
By: ELLIOTT W. EVANS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
